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title to be in the person taxed. Possession is not merely a badge
of ownership, it is title,10 6 and, further, it is stated, that the authority
to seize any property in the possession of the person taxed for the
payment of the tax, even though it is a bailment, 017 or sold on a
conditional sales contract, is due process of law, and is constitu-
tional. L08 This statute has been upheld by our courts, but the authors
have found no decisions of the United States Courts on this point.
What treatment it will receive there, in the light of the eminent
domain and the due process clauses, is speculative. Suffice it to say
our courts have held it to be constitutional time and again.'09
As yet, of course, there has been no litigation under the New
York City Sales Tax. It has been the purpose of this review to
present the possible points of conflict with a view to determining
the social and legal aspects involved.
CARL E. ALPER AND MOSES J. KATZ.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE "YELLOW-DoG" CONTRACT STATUTE.
"The widespread use of this type of contract and the injunction
against labor is slowly impeding a large number of our population
to such an extent that many workers are beginning to look upon
the courts as allies of the employer class. If the laborer feels
that justice cannot be obtained through the medium of the courts,
he will use his own methods. Industrial peace is extremely diffi-
cult to maintain if the workers are not permitted to associate
openly, since secret, underground organizations will then flourish.
When responsible trade-unionism was driven out of Colorado
some years ago, radical labor organizations stepped in with ensuing
violence and lawlessness."'
Such is the attitude of organized labor toward the use and effect
of the "yellow-dog" labor contract, that instrument by which an
employee is required to bind himself, as a condition of his employ-
ment, that he will not remain or become a member of a labor organiza-
tion (except, possibly, a "company" union).
Congress, and many of the states, long ago began making efforts
to ban the use of such contracts by passing laws rendering them un-
oHersie v. Porter; Lake Shore El. Ry. Co. v. Roach; see Sheldon v.
Van Buskirk, all supra note 95.
' Pauley v. Wahle, 29 Hun 116, 16 Week. Dig. 462 (N. Y. 1883).
' o Sheldon v. Van Buskirk, supra note 95; Coie v. Carl, 82 Hun 360, 31
N. Y. Supp. 565, 64 St. Rep. 155 (1894).
' " Supra notes 106, 107 and 108.
'O'Leary, The Case Against the Yellow-Dog Labor Contract (March 1932)
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lawful. In every instance these attempts were blocked by the courts,
which unfailingly held the statutes to be unconstitutional. 2
But the effort has continued unabated, and now New York has
finally followed the lead of Ohio, Wisconsin, Oregon, Arizona and
Colorado and the United States Congress, and has passed legislation 3
sponsored by the American Federation of Labor in an effort to de-
vise a statute which will overcome the objections to the previous
enactments.4
'United States: 30 STAT. 426 (U. S. Comp. St. 1901), p. 3210, declared
unconstitutional in Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 161, 28 Sup. Ct. 277(1908); Railroad Telegraphers v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 148 Fed. 437(1906), appeal dismissed, 214 U. S. 529, 29 Sup. Ct 695; and United States v.
Scott, 148 Fed. 431 (D. C. 1906).
California: PENAL CODE §679 (1923), declared unconstitutional in Mont-
gomery v. Pacific Electric R. Co., 294 Fed. 680 (C. C. A. 9th, 1923), cert.
denied, 264 U. S. 586, 44 Sup. Ct. 334 (1924).
Colorado: Sess. Laws of 1911, c. 5, declared unconstitutional in People v.
Western U. Telegraph Co., 70 Colo. 90, 198 Pac. 146, 15 A. L. R. 326 (1921).
Illinois: HuRD's RV. STAT. 1899, c. 48, §32, declared unconstitutional in
Gillespie v. People, 188 Ill. 176, 58 N. E. 1007, 52 L. R. A. 283 (1900).
Kansas: Laws of 1903, c. 22, §§4674 and 4675, GEN. STAT. KANS. (1909)
declared unconstitutional in Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 1, 35 Sup. Ct. 240(1915) ; Laws of 1897, c. 120, declared unconstitutional in Coffeyville Vitrified
Brick & Tile Co. v. Perry, 69 Kan. 297, 76 Pac. 848, 66 L. R. A. 185 (1904).
Minnesota: Rev. Laws of 1905, §5097, declared unconstitutional in State
ex rel. Smith v. Daniels, 118 Minn. 155, 136 N. W. 584 (1912).
Missouri: Statute declared unconstitutional in State v. Julow, 129 Mo. 163,
31 S. W. 781, 29 L. R. A. 257 (1895).
New York: Laws of 1884, c. 688, adding §171-a to the Penal Code,
declared unconstitutional in People v. Marcus, 185 N. Y. 257, 77 N. E. 1073,
7 L. R. A. (N. s.) 282 (1906).
Nevada: Laws of 1903, c. 111, p. 207, declared unconstitutional in Goldfield
Consol. Mines Co. v. Goldfield Miners' Union, 159 Fed. 500 (C. C. 1908).
Ohio: BATEs' ANN. STAT. §§4367-68 (1892), declared unconstitutional in
State v. Bateman, 7 Ohio N. P. 487, 10 Ohio D. N. P. 68 (1900); and OHio
GEN. CODE §12943, declared unconstitutional in Re Berger, 15 Ohio C. C. N. S.
81, 33 Ohio C. C. 289 (1912), af'd, 92 Ohio St. 130, 110 N. E. 732 (1915).
Oklahoma: Comp. Laws of 1909, §4041, declared unconstitutional in Bemis
v. State, 12 Okla. Crim. Rep. 114, 152 Pac. 456 (1915).
Wisconsin: Laws of 1899, c. 332, declared unconstitutional in State ex rel.
Zillmer v. Kreutzberg, 114 Wis. 530, 90 N. W. 1098, 58 L. R. A. 748 (1902).
In only one case (Davis v. State, 30 Ohio L. J. 342), so far as I have been
able to find, has the constitutionality of such a statute been sustained, and
this decision was rendered by an inferior court before the rendition of any of
the decisions of the higher courts cited above, and was repudiated in the same
state by the later cases of State v. Bateman, supra, and Re Berger, supra.
It is interesting to note that many of the decisions declaring these statutes
invalid antedated the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in the
Adair and Coppage cases, supra, and so were not based on the authority of
those cases. This was true of the New York case of People v. Marcus, supra.
'N. Y. Laws of 1935, c. 11, adding §17 to the CIVIL RIGHTS LAW (Cons.
Laws, c. 6).
'Briefly summarized, the major reasons advanced by the courts for the
unconstitutionality of these statutes are about as follows:
(a) They are violative of the due process clauses of the federal consti-
tution and the constitutions of the various states. (U. S. CONST., FOURTEENTH
AMEND. §1; FIFTH AMEND.; N. Y. CONsT., art. I, §6.) "An employer has
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To determine whether or not this attempt is likely to prove suc-
cessful, is the purpose of this note. It Fnay be stated at the outset
that bills embodying almost identical provisions have been introduced
in the legislatures of Massachusetts and New Hampshire, but failed
of passage on being held unconstitutional in advisory opinions of the
Supreme Courts of those states.5
The new statute is different in form from its predecessors which
have had such an unfortunate history in this country. They were
of two classes: Those which rendered it unlawful to threaten an
employee with discharge if he joined a labor union; and those which
declared it unlawful and criminal for an employer to enter into a
contract with an employee by which the latter agreed not to join a
the same right to prescribe terms on 'which he will employ one to labor as an
employee has to prescribe those on which he will sell his labor, and any
legislation which disturbs this equality is an unjustifiable interference with
the liberty of contract." (Adair v. United States, supra note 4.) "Under
constitutional freedom of contract, whatever either party has the right to
treat as sufficient ground for terminating the employment, where there is no
stipulation on the subject, he has the right to provide against by insisting that
a stipulation respecting it shall be a sine qua iton of the inception of the
employment, or of its continuance if it be terminable at will." (Coppage v.
Kansas, supra note 4.)
(b) They are violative of the "equal protection of the laws" clauses of
the federal and state constitutions. (U. S. CoxsT., FOURTEENTH AMEND. §1.)
(C) The enactment of such statutes is not a valid exercise of the police
power, in that they do not tend to promote the public health, welfare, comfort
or safety; nor do they prevent the commission of any offense or other manifest
evil. Labor unions "are not public institutions, charged by law with public
or governmental duties, such as would render the maintenance of their mem-
bership a matter of direct concern to the general welfare." (Coppage v.
Kansas, supra.)
(d) Such statutes constitute an invasion of the inalienable right of
personal liberty.
(e) For the courts to uphold such legislation would create a dangerous
precedent. "Once admit that the legislature has the power to restrain the
individual from conducting his business in his own way, when such restraint
is not required for the public welfare, then there is no limit to the restraint
which can be imposed; and that would be despotism pure and simple." (State
v. Bateman, supra note 4.)
(f) The doctrine of stare decisis is conclusive, even in the case of
statutes practically identical to the New York statute. See Re Opinion of
Justices (N. H.) and Re Opinion of Justices (Mass.), both infra note 5.
In the former case, after citing the Adair and Coppage cases, the court said:
"It is true that these decisions have been the subject of adverse comment; but
the arguments thus advanced were fully and ably presented to the court and
received careful consideration in the opinions rendered. It is useless to argue
that the decisions are wrong. They are the supreme law of the land, to which
we are required to yield obedience."
'5 MASS. HousE Doc. No. 299 (1930), held unconstitutional in In re
Opinion of Justices, 271 Mass. 598, 171 N. E. 234, 68 A. L. R. 1265 (1930) ;
MAss. HousE Doc. No. 976 (1931), held unconstitutional in In re Opinion of
Justices, 275 Mass. 580, 176 N. E. 649 (1931); NEw HAmp. HouSE BILL No.
148 (1933), held unconstitutional in In re Opinion of Justices (N. H.), 166
Atl. 640 (1933).
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union. In the present law, nothing about such a contract is ruled
to be unlawful. There is no penalty imposed for making it. The
section simply states that such contracts are contrary to public policy
and wholly void, and shall not afford a basis for legal or equitable
relief in the courts. If this difference is of substance as well as of
form, perhaps the law has some chance of surviving. But if it is
merely a matter of form, I fear that the act will go the way of those
which have preceded it.
As there is nothing' unlawful in the making of the contract, it
is only when the aid of the courts in enforcing it is sought to be
invoked that the question of constitutionality will arise. When -vill
this aid be sought?
Not when the employee joins a union and quits his employ-
ment, will the employer seek to restrain him from joining a union,
for the right to quit (except, of course, in the rare cases of employ-
ment for a definite period) at any time and for any or no reason at
all, is well-recognized. 6
Nor, as a practical matter, and for the same reasons, will relief
in the courts be sought by an employee to compel his employer to
retain him once he has joined a union. Even in the absence of a
contract, the laborer has no such right. 7 Indeed, as far as employer
and employee alone are concerned, the law is of little importance.
The reason for its enactment and its clear purpose is found
in the last few lines: "* * [Such contract] shall not afford any
basis for the granting of legal or equitable relief * * * against any
other persons who may advise, urge or induce, without fraud, vio-
lence, or threat thereof, either party thereto to act in disregard of
such undertaking or- promise." The true object of the law is to
prevent the use of such a contract by employers for the purpose of
obtaining injunctions restraining labor organizations from efforts to
unionize their employees. It is this right and the effect of the statute
thereon that will be raised in the courts and that will determine the
validity of the law.
It is clear that in the absence of any contract between employer
and employee, the right to unionize another's employees by means
of peaceful persuasion, when the object in view is lawful, is well
recognized.8
But where a contract is involved, the situation is different. It
is a general rule that intentional interference, without justification,
with the contractual rights of another, with knowledge thereof, is a
'National Protective Ass'n v. Cumming, 170 N. Y. 315, 63 N. E. 369
(1902). Even if the fact that the employee "quit" constituted a technical
breach, the inability of the employer to prove any damages, or to collect them
if he could, would render a damage suit useless.
"National Protective Ass'n v. Cumming, szapra note 6.8 International Organization, U. M. W. v. Red Jacket Consol. Coal &
Coke Co., 18 F. (2d) 839 (C. C. A. 4th, 1927), cert. denied, 275 U. S. 536,
48 Sup. Ct. 31 (1927) ; Interborough Rapid Transit Co. v. Lavin, 247 N. Y. 65,
159 N. E. 863, 63 A. L. R. 188 (1928).
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legal wrong, and an action will lie to recover damages resulting
therefrom. 9 And, what is more important here, injunction is an
available remedy in cases of attempts to procure another to breach
his contract. 10
These general rules were applied by the United States Supreme
Court to the activities of a labor organization in inducing the breach
of a "yellow-dog" contract, in the celebrated Hitchman case.'1 Criti-
cized though that case may be, in most respects, it still represents the
law.' 2 Although it is true that the New York courts have not been
as free in granting labor injunctions as some of the other courts,' 3
and although the Court of Appeals has indicated that a "yellow-dog"
contract is not a real contract at all, because of lack of mutuality,14
nevertheless, despite their well-known liberality, the New York courts
have often enjoined third persons from endeavoring to persuade
employees to breach such a contract, or condition, of employment.'9
It must be noted in this connection that where an employee is
under a contract not to join a union during his employment, a dis-
tinction must be made between persuasion to join a union and per-
suasion to breach the contract or condition. The persuasion to join
the union, in itself, is not unlawful; but the persuasion to get the
employee to join the union, and at the same time remain in his em-
ployment, and thus breach the contract, is unlawful.' 6
Hornstein v. Podwitz, 254 N. Y. 448, 173 N. E. 674, 84 A. L. R. 1
(1930). Further, the use of the word "malicious" in describing the tort of
maliciously inducing the breach of a contract, "does not necessarily mean
malice or ill will, but the intentional doing of a wrongful act without legal or
social justification." (Campbell v. Gates, 236 N. Y. 457, at 460, 141 N. E.
914, at 915 [19231.)
"Eagle Glass & Mfg. Co. v. Rowe, 245 U. S. 275, 38 Sup. Ct. 80 (1917);
Standard Fashion Co. v. Siegel-Cooper Co., 30 App. Div. 564, 52 N. Y. Supp.
433 (1898), aff'd, 157 N. Y. 60, 51 N. E. 408, 43 L. R. A. 854 (1898).
"Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229, 38 Sup. Ct. 65,
L. R. A. 1918C (1917).
See United Chain Theatres, Inc. v. Philadelphia Moving Picture Mach.
Operators Union, 50 F. (2d) 189 (D. C. E. D. Pa. 1931). However, thejurisdiction of the Federal District Courts to issue such injunction has been
limited. See infra note 27.
Stillwell Theatre, Inc. v. Kaplan, 259 N. Y. 405, 182 N. E. 63, 84 A. L.
R. 6 (1932); Interborough Rapid Transit Co. v. Lavin, supra note 8.
' See Exchange Bakery & Restaurant v. Rifkin, 245 N. Y. 260, 157 N. E.
130 (1927) ; Interborough Rapid Transit Co. v. Lavin, szpra note 8.
' See Third Ave. Ry. Co. v. Shea, 109 Misc. 18, 179 N. Y. Supp. 43
(1919), aff'd, 191 App. Div. 949, 181 N. Y. Supp. 956 (1920); Michaels v.
Hillman, 111 Misc. 284, 181 N. Y. Supp. 165 (1920); Meltzer v. Kaminer,
131 Misc. 813, 227 N. Y. Supp. 459 (1927); Vail-Ballou Press, Inc. v. Casey,
125 Misc. 689, 212 N. Y. Supp. 115 (1925). Contra: Interborough Rapid
Transit Co. v. Green, 131 Misc. 682, 227 N. Y. Supp. 258 (1928) ; cf. Stillwell
Theatre v. Kaplan, supra note 13; Interborough Rapid Transit Co. v. Lavin,
supra note 8. The general attitude of the New York courts may perhaps be
summed up by stating that each individual case is to be considered in connection
with its own facts and circumstances, with a view to sound public policy.
" Bittner v. West Virginia Pittsburgh Coal Co., 15 F. (2d) 652 (C. C. A.
4th, 1926) ; International Organization, etc. v. Red Jacket, etc., supra note 8.
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It is obvious that the former is not what organized labor wants.
It is of no advantage to it to secure new members, without at the
same time increasing the organization of industry. Otherwise, the
competition in the organized portion of the industry would be in-
creased, while non-union men would take the place of those in-
duced to join the union and quit their employment in the unorganized
factory. Such activities in furtherance of the unionization of an em-
ployer's shop where the "yellow-dog" contract system is in force are
just what can be restrained. As the court said in the Red Jacket
case: 1
7
"To make a speech or to circulate an argument under ordinary
circumstances dwelling upon the advantages of union mem-
bership is one thing. To approach a company's employees,
working under a contract not to join the union while remain-
ing in the company's service, and induce them, in violation of
their contracts, to join the union and go on strike for the pur-
pose of forcing the company to recognize the union or of
impairing its power of productiveness, is another and very
different thing."
In other words, the employer's aim in requiring his employees
to enter into a contract not to become members of a union, is to
prevent the unionization of his business.' 8 That he has the right to
do this, and that it is a right protected by the constitutions of both
nation and state, is recognized in all the applicable cases cited herein.
Just how does the New York statute under consideration affect
this right? It seems to me that the answer is simple: The right is
denied to the employer as effectually as if the making of the contract
were declared utterly unlawful. The mere privilege of entering into
a contract which from its inception is wholly void and unenforceable,
and which specifically is declared not to afford a basis for granting
to the employer the only relief in which he has any interest, is at
best an empty and naked right.
I am fully familiar with the powerful economic and social argu-
ments against the "yellow-dog" contract and in favor of laws pro-
hibiting its use as an effective method of blocking the laborer in his
efforts to achieve collective bargaining.' 9 Likewise, I am cognizant
1
"Supra note 8.
2' As a matter of fact, union officials are reluctant to attempt to organize
industries where the "yellow-dog" contract system prevails, because of the
probability that expensive court proceedings will result. Thus the likelihood
of an added drain on the union finances acts as a retarding influence on
organizing work. See O'Leary, The Case Against the Yellow-Dog Labor
Contract, supra note 1.
" These arguments, as advanced by labor leaders, are set forth at some
length in SIEDMAx, THE YELLOw-DOG CONTRACT (Johns Hopkins Press,
Baltimore, 1932).
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that the Supreme Court in a number of instances, both before and
since the Coppage and Adair cases,20 has departed from the strict
letter of the premise on which those decisions were based-that any
interference with the right of an employer to hire and "fire" as he
sees fit is unconstitutional. I am also well aware that the refusal
of Congress and many state legislatures to acquiesce in the doctrine,
as is instanced by repeated attempts to render "yellow-dog" con-
tracts illegal, 21 might well have some weight with the courts. Nor
am I ignorant of the fact that the courts have at times been willing
to vary the meaning of "due process" to meet changing economic and
social conditions, 22 and that the due process clause is to serve simply
to limit legislative activity .to what is reasonable.
In fact, if the question were arising for the first time, when
the labor injunction has attained such widespread and general use
as a weapon of the employer,23 the courts might be constrained to
regard the legislation more favorably, in spite of the rule that, in
general, economic and moral theories are not to be considered in de-
termining the constitutionality of statutes. 24
But since the question has been before the highest courts in the
land many times, and always with the same unvarying results, I
cannot conceive, if the doctrine of stare decisis has any meaning (as
unquestionably it has 25 ), that either the New York or the federal
courts will reverse their former positions and hold that this statute,
restricting as it does the right of employers and employees to enter
into a lawful contract of employment, is not forbidden by the due
process clauses of the state and federal constitutions. 26
Supra note 2.
See statutes cited, supra note 2. See also Due Process and the Employ-
ment Contract (1931) 44 HARV. L. Rav. 1287.
'See United States Rys. v. United States, 280 U. S. 234, 50 Sup. Ct. 123(1930).
'See SIEDMAN, op. cit. supra note 19; also cases cited in 32 C. J. 230
(§365).
"The Federal and state constitutions are the charter which mark the
extent and limitations of legislative power, and under our form of government
courts must regard all economic, philosophical and moral theories, attractive
and desirable though they may be, as subordinate to the primary question
whether they can be molded into statutes without infringing upon the letter or
spirit of our written constitutions." (Ives v. South Buffalo Ry. Co., 201 N.
Y. 271, at 287, 94 N. E. 431 [19111.)
'As was said by Ruger, Ch. J., in Lahr v. Metropolitan Elevated R. Co.,
104 N. Y. 268, at 287, 10 N. E. 528 (1887) : "The doctrine of the Story case,
therefore, although pronounced by a divided court, must be considered as
stare decisis upon all questions involved therein, and as establishing the law, as
well for this court as for the people of the State, whenever similar questions
may be litigated."
'The principles of the Adair and Coppage cases have been reiterated and
these cases cited with approval by the Supreme Court in the following recent
cases: Prudential Insurance Co. v. Cheek, 259 U. S. 530, at 536, 42 Sup. Ct.
516 (1921) ; Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525 at 545, 43 Sup. Ct.
344, 24 A. L. R. 1238 (1922) ; Highland v. Russell Car & Snow Plow Co., 279
U. S. 253 at 261, 49 Sup. Ct. 314 (1928) ; and the Marcus case in New York
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In short, I conclude: That as far as practical results are con-
cerned and as far the primary intent of the legislature is involved,
the difference between this and the penal statutes is one without a
real distinction. In the one, the exercise of a right guaranteed by
the constitution is branded as an offense; in the other, it is declared
to be a meaningless formality. If the legislature has no power to
prevent persons who are sui juris from making any lawful contract
they see fit, relative to their own labor, it has no power to declare
such contract a nullity, for the net result is the same-the use of the
contract is as effectually barred in the one case as in the other. In
both, the right to hire and discharge freely is hindered and restricted;
and both laws are an interference with the right of employer and
employee to prescribe the terms of labor, an interference which has
been repeatedly held not to be sanctioned by the police power.2 7
I am therefore irresistibly forced to the conclusion that the new
Section 17 of the Civil Rights Law is a clear violation of the rule
laid down by the Court of Appeals, that:
"The free and untrammeled right to contract is a part
of the liberty guaranteed to every citizen by the Federal and
State Constitutions. Personal liberty is always subject to re-
straint when its exercise affects the safety, health or moral
and general welfare of the public, but subject to such re-
straint an employer and employee may make and enforce such
has been cited by the Court of Appeals as recently as last year, in Sherman v.
Abeles, 265 N. Y.' 383 at 390, 193 N. E. 241 (1934).
" The fact that the Norris-La Guardia Anti-Injunction Bill (47 STAT. 90,
March 23, 1932; 29 U. S. C. A. §§101-115) has to date been upheld by the
courts is by no means indicative that the instant statute will be. The constitu-
tionality of that act was sustained upon the ground that Congress has the
power to withdraw the jurisdiction of the Federal District Court from labor
disputes in the instances specified in the law. "Congress may give either whole
or restricted jurisdiction in its discretion, provided there is no extension beyond
the boundaries fixed by the Constitution [citing casesi, and Congress has the
power to regulate the power which it grants. (Levering & Garrigues Co. v.
Morrin, 71 Fed. (2d) 284 [C. C. A. 2d, 1934], cert. denied, 289 U. S. 103, 55
Sup. Ct. 110 [1934]; Cinderella Theatre Co. v. Sign Writers Local Union, 6
Fed. Supp. 164 [D. C. Mich. 19341; see also Kline v. Burke Construction Co.,
260 U. S. 226 at 233, 43 Sup. Ct. 79 [1922].) There is a "fundamental distinc-
tion between the power of Congress to regulate procedure and limit thejurisdiction of the Federal courts inferior to the United States Supreme Court,
and the power of the legislature to regulate procedure and limit the jurisdic-
tion of the courts created by the Constitution of a state." (A. J. Monday
Co. v. Automobile, Aircraft & Vehicle Workers, 171 Wis. 532, 177 N. W.
867 [1920].) In fact, this limitation on the jurisdiction of the New York
Supreme Court is an additional and strong argument against the constitu-
tionality of the statute under consideration, into which I have not gone as I
believe the due process and equal protection of the laws arguments to be de-
cisive. (See N. Y. CorsT., art. Vil, §1.) For the same reason, I have not
gone into any possible effect of the National Industrial Recovery Act (48 STAT.
195), particularly of the noted §7 (a) thereof. For a general discussion of this
subject, see Annotation, 92 A. L. R. 1464, particularly at 1470 and 1471; also
Sherman v. Abeles, supra note 26.
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contracts relating to labor as they may agree upon." (Italics
interpolated.) 28
And further, I believe that it unquestionably falls within the pro-
hibition prescribed by the United States Supreme Court, that:
"* * * since a State may not strike them [life, liberty or
property] down directly, it is clear that it may not do so in-
directly, as by declaring in effect that the public good requires
the removal of those inequalities that are but the normal and
inevitable result of their exercise, and then invoking the police
power in order to remove the inequalities, without other object
in view." 29
The act attempts to make legal what otherwise would be illegal-the
interference with a contractual condition of employment. The fact
that it assumes only to restrict the remedy does not save it, since
the effect of taking away the only adequate remedy to protect a right
is to take away the right infringed upon.
WESLEY DAVIS.
THE NEW YORK MORTGAGE CoMMIssIoN.-Continuing to stress
the chaotic conditions which have warranted past mortgage legisla-
tion,' the legislature of the state of New York passed an enactment
creating a Mortgage Commission 2 to supersede the authority of the
state superintendent of insurance and the state superintendent of
banks under the Schackno Act.3 To outline the conditions calling
for this legislative action would be a needless repetition of that which
is common knowledge and of that which has been the subject of
much discussion in previous issues of this Review.4
The Mortgage Commission Act presents problems similar in
character to those encountered in the preceding mortgage legislation.
It is thus advisable for us to retrace and delve back into past legis-
lative actions and court decisions to determine the constitutional re-
strictions by which the courts have bound statutes of this type.
People v. Marcus, supra note 2, at 259.
' Coppage v. Kansas, supra note 2, at 17-18.
'Note (1934) 8 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 208; id. 315; Legis. (1934) 9 ST.
JOHN'S L. REv. 266; Feinberg, The New York Mortgage Moratorium Statute(1934) 9 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 71; (1934) 34 COL. L. REv. 663.
' Laws of 1935, c. 19.
'Laws of 1933, c. 745.
'Supra note 1.
